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Whatever Happened to Green Collar Jobs? Populism and Clean Energy Transition 
Sarah Knuth  
Department of Geography, Durham University 
 
In today’s populist moment, climate change response has become anything but “post-political”. 
The project to decarbonize energy supplies is generating ongoing political clashes today, 
including between competing forms of capital/ism. In the United States, rising renewable energy 
industries in places like California contend with fossil fuel blocs and their regional bases. Such 
confrontations are sparking populist organizing on the right and left. I argue that critical 
geography must further consider left populist movements’ role in these politics of clean energy 
transition, grievance, and reparation; and openings for collectively advancing more liberatory 
futures. I survey a wave of coalition-building that has evolved in the United States since the 
beginnings of the New Economy, allying U.S. environmentalists, organized labor, and more 
recently racial and community justice organizers. This movement became most visible as it built 
networks around calls for national “green collar” job creation during the late 2000s financial 
crisis and 2008 Presidential campaign. Its organizing shaped noteworthy, if ultimately limited 
Obama Administration programs and continues to influence clean energy rollout in regions such 
as California; particularly, campaigns for job quality and racial diversity in green construction. I 
consider here both these successes and their limits in a turbulent cleantech sector: the need for 
farther-reaching transformations in energy-industrial policy, and democratic participation in 
shaping them. 
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Left Populism for a Climate Post-“Post-Politics” 
In today’s moment of surging populisms, climate response has become anything but “post-
political” -- if, indeed, it ever was so (Swyngedouw 2010; McCarthy 2013). Behind 
Swyngedouw’s “socio-chemical” enemy lie livelihoods, accumulation regimes, and entrenched 
power relations: many constituencies for whom climate action appears more dangerous and 
damaging than inaction. The project to decarbonize energy supplies shapes many forms of this 
in/action, and critical energy geography is now illuminating many such struggles. Beyond the 
field’s ongoing examination of extractive economies and petropolitics (too extensive to review 
here), a wave of recent research is taking on global geographies of clean energy rollout, and the 
green capitalist programs typically propelling it (see, for example, Pasqualetti 2011; Bridge et al. 
2013; Huber and McCarthy 2017; McEwan 2017). This work is revealing new forms and 
articulations of grievance, and new claims for justice, remedy, and reparation -- key lineaments 
in the production of political formations, including left and right-wing populisms. Given the 
political ecological and agrarian political economic bent of much of this scholarship, it is not 
surprising that struggles over rural land and livelihoods feature prominently. Indeed, it would be 
startling to find otherwise: solar and wind energy infrastructures are now being rapidly deployed 
in many contexts, and producing major land transformations (joining parallel conversions for 
biofuels, notably in land grabs after the 2008 financial collapse; Baka 2013).  
 
I argue that this research, although necessary to expand geography’s frontiers of scholarship and 
praxis on energy transition, is not sufficient to confront current political movements, on (at least) 
two levels. Like political ecology in general, it better captures capitalism’s imperialist moment in 
resource (neo-)peripheries than its dialectically entangled struggles “at home”. Particularly, it 
insufficiently addresses capital’s tendency to fracture into competing blocs, techno-industrial and 
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regional -- ones who wage bitter struggles for supremacy and ongoing accumulation. Such zero-
sum confrontations and competitive devaluations are a classic concern of geographical political 
economy, as the field has tracked this creative destruction in the conjoined rise and fall of 
regional and urban economies (Harvey 1982; Storper and Walker 1989; Markusen et al. 1991). 
In the U.S. context that I discuss here, such clashes have helped spark new populist formations, 
as cross-class alliances and blocs assemble to boost regions or combat their decline -- often 
through competition to capture the federal state apparatus, with its powers over development 
policy and the geographic redistribution of wealth (Fraser and Gerstle 1989). Crucially, U.S. 
energy transition (and climate policy) is now being fought out in such sectional battles and 
prospective devaluations, increasingly openly (Knuth 2017).1 Rising renewable energy industries 
in places like California now contend with entrenched and new fossil fuel production regions. In 
the long rightward shift in U.S. populism since (especially) the Reagan Revolution (Kazin 1998; 
McGirr 2002; Frank 2007), right-wing movement-builders have drawn upon this sharpening 
geographical division multiple times -- most recently, in the Tea Party’s “drill, baby, drill” 
advocacy for domestic oil and gas (amid broader invocations to defend “fly-over country” and its 
hazily imagined true America from coastal elites), and Trump’s 2016 campaign promises to roll 
back Obama era climate policy and “save” Appalachian coal.2  
 
In deepening energy geography’s analysis of these confrontations, scholars must expand political 
ecology’s work on conservative populist movements (McCarthy 2002), and continue to bridge 
political ecology and economy on industrial questions (e.g., Huber 2017). More particularly, I 
argue, energy geographers must further consider left populisms. We are still struggling to 
conceptualize their role, existing and potential, in political blocs for clean energy transition, 
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particularly in urban and techno-industrial capitalist centers. Such ambiguities often bleed into 
our own critical praxis. Green economic development programs dreamed up in places like 
Silicon Valley present optimistic technofuturist visions of new surplus. This turn away from 
Anthropocene millenarianism and Neo-Malthusianism has been attractive to some political 
ecologists, notwithstanding its naivety, genuine or strategic, about the failings of green 
capitalism. (For example, see conflicting and shifting takes from Latour 2011, 2015; Collard, 
Dempsey, and Sundberg 2015; Robbins and Moore 2015 on how to interact with the 
Breakthrough Institute, the particularly aggressive ecomodernist advocate based in the San 
Francisco Bay Area.) Today’s radical cheapening and expansion of renewable energy presents 
undeniable opportunities for a climate movement long confounded by the difficulties of 
organizing around shared scarcity. An already dubious prospect for winning broad allegiance, in 
the U.S. context such a project has been further encumbered by cultural suspicions (from many 
directions) of liberal-elite “voluntary simplicity”. With the prospect of affordable clean energy 
and new jobs producing it, transition supporters might more aggressively and successively 
contest the fossil fuel bloc -- overcoming post-political conciliations like Obama era “all of the 
above” energy policy.3 However, this new hope conceals crucial uncertainties. How many clean 
energy jobs will there actually be, and for whom? Will they be good and stable ones? Will there 
be enough of them in the right places? If not, are there other options for making remedy or 
reparation to fossil industry workers and regions? Such dilemmas are matters of both justice and 
political urgency for a movement that confronts substantial populist resistance. They suggest a 
further, crucial one: who gets to participate in debating and deciding these questions?  
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In the remainder of this paper, I will briefly consider one U.S. attempt to answer the last 
question, and in the process many of the others. I survey a wave of left populist coalition-
building that has evolved over the last twenty years.4 Among its other outcomes, this organizing 
has helped shape major clean energy development programs in California and nationally under 
the Obama Administration. As policy advocacy, it became most visible in calls for national 
“green collar” job creation during the late 2000s financial crisis and stimulus, prominently 
articulated by Van Jones (2008) and advanced during the 2008 Presidential campaign by entities 
such as the Apollo Alliance, Green for All, the Center for American Progress, and the Center on 
Wisconsin Strategy (COWS). In these calls, blue-green alliances of labor unions and 
environmentalists joined with racial and community justice organizers in new ways. However, 
this movement has deeper roots. Its vision reflects the distinctive political tensions of places like 
California and the Pacific Northwest in the 1980s and 1990s. In the New Economy, these regions 
rose as “post-industrial” technological leaders and environmentalist hotbeds, even as their older 
resource extraction and manufacturing job bases declined -- a conjoining that prompted both 
enduring grievance and new visions for remedy. In the 2010s, California regional advocates 
continue to push for good, diverse jobs in clean energy, as the state experiments with what kind 
of “cleantech” innovator it might become, and who might share in the planning and proceeds of 
such development. Since the late 2000s, many movement proposals have centered around 
building a clean energy economy in the United States, in a quite literal sense: they focus their 
visions for working class clean energy jobs on weatherization and energy efficiency retrofitting, 
rooftop solar panel installation, and infrastructure development for utility-scale solar and wind 
power plants. All resemble traditional construction and building trades work. This sector presents 
a problematic U.S. political inheritance -- notably, if not exclusively, in its racial politics -- that 
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populist alliances have recently sought to reform into self-consciously progressive race-class 
programs. However, the movement’s strategy raises deeper questions. In a clean energy 
economy jostled by would-be tech visionaries and destabilizing global restructurings, must left 
populisms (among other prospective left political formations) demand farther-reaching 
transformations in energy-industrial policy, and the power to shape them? 
 
 
The Movement for Green Collar Jobs -- Building a/s Solution? 
Understanding the roots of green collar jobs alliances requires looking also to right-wing 
populism. As the New Economy began to reshape Western resource economies and cultures, it 
sharpened existing anti-environmentalist resistance -- for example, from rural right-wing 
movements like Wise Use (McCarthy 2002). New Economy in-migrants, including 
environmentalists and wealthy rural homebuyers-turned-preservationists, drew fresh ire (e.g., 
Walker 2003). Through such protests, the right constructed a persistent common sense (after 
Gramsci) grievance of “jobs versus the environment.” It now recurrently deploys this trope to 
flog environmentalists for supposed elitism and cluelessness about the costs of environmental 
regulation to workers, particularly in already-embattled resource industries -- echoing elements 
of political ecologists’ own critiques of mainstream conservation, sans their nuance on white 
settler colonialisms. The Pacific Northwest became one important proving ground for such 
confrontations, in nationally prominent clashes between the timber industry, workers, and 
conservationists. The term “green collar” jobs was coined in this regional political moment, in a 
book by Alan Durning (1999). In it, Durning attempted to grapple with the Pacific Northwest’s 
declining rural jobs, amid its simultaneous transformation into a hub of New Economic tech 
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growth. The volume argued that newly emerging working class jobs in fields such as 
environmental restoration had the potential to offset resource industry jobs lost. It offered an 
alternative to both the timber industry’s zero-sum framing and the New Economy’s bifurcated 
job structure: high-wage tech employment for the highly educated, particularly white men; 
combined with low-wage, insecure service work (or no work) for most others. 
 
Notions of green collar employment reflected the period’s broader ecological modernization 
proposals: nascent green capitalist visions of economic decoupling (growth detached from its 
energy and resource metabolisms) and a rejuvenated post-industrial economy. However, the 
idea’s subsequent travels were facilitated by other new imaginaries of the era, ones that required 
more deliberate political work to construct. Through the 1990s, progressive/left populist 
organizers pioneered the notion of blue-green alliances, a project that sought to unite disparate 
strands in the embattled U.S. left. This alliance-building brought together progressive wings of 
established institutions: the Democratic Party’s mid-twentieth century base of industrial labor 
unions, and the environmental advocacy interests that rose in the party from the 1970s onward. 
At the grassroots, environmental activists and workers developed these blue-green politics 
through shared resistance to neoliberal free trade rollout, with the 1999 anti-World Trade 
Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle a crystallizing moment (Cockburn and St. Clair 2000). 
 
Through the 2000s, this movement-building gained national prominence and saw mainstream 
Democratic Party uptake, in mobilizations around successive Democratic defeats in Presidential 
elections and George W. Bush-era energy and environmental policies. Newly formed blue-green 
advocates like the Apollo Alliance embraced novel kinds of ecomodernism and technological 
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futurism. Increasingly, these efforts opened up potential collaborations with Silicon Valley 
venture capitalists and tech interests. From the tech side, this green turn proved attractive to a 
host of entrepreneurs and investors, then casting about for new opportunities after the collapse of 
the first New Economy boom in 2001 (Caprotti 2017; Knuth 2017). Collectively, these efforts 
helped kick off a wave of U.S. cleantech investment centered in Silicon Valley and the Bay Area 
(especially, although see Goldstein 2018). As this nascent boom gathered steam from the mid 
2000s, would-be tech visionaries imagined new fundamental breakthroughs in clean energy 
technologies and business models -- a fresh source of regional super-profits and surplus from a 
national and global economy (Knuth 2018a). 
 
From the mid-2000s, urban organizers expressed growing concerns about the exclusions and 
costs of this new green growth. Racial and community justice institutions in places like West 
Oakland warned of its power to exacerbate an already highly uneven New Economy and its 
problems -- to once again pass impoverished communities by in terms of stable employment, 
atop existing harms from institutionalized racism and the carceral state (Gilmore 2007), 
environmental injustice, deindustrialization, and long-term urban disinvestment. In 2005, Van 
Jones questioned, “will the green wave lift all boats?” He was skeptical: “right now we have eco-
apartheid. Look at Marin; they've got solar this, and bio this, and organic the other, and fifteen 
minutes away by car, you're in Oakland with cancer clusters, asthma, and pollution” (Jones, in 
Strickland 2005). These criticisms echoed similar calls for “just sustainabilities” (Agyeman and 
Evans 2003), which as the green wave spread -- increasingly as a project for urban 
(re)development and branding as much as clean energy transition -- have expanded into protests 
against new “green” gentrification (e.g., Checker 2011; Knuth 2016, 2018b).  
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However, in the late 2000s, a raft of organizers in Oakland and elsewhere simultaneously 
questioned whether the green economy opened up opportunities to do technologically advanced 
economic development differently. Raquel Pinderhughes helped translate Durning’s green collar 
jobs concept to the urban Bay Area context around 2004 (e.g., Pinderhughes 2006). By 2005, 
Jones, who became green collar jobs’ most visible U.S. champion, was working to disseminate 
the term and its organizing vision regionally, and jumping scale (Smith 1992) to reframe it as a 
national economic strategy. A raft of efforts in the late 2000s fleshed out this call (e.g., Gordon 
et al. 2008; Jones 2008). In a 2009 interview in Antipode, Jones articulated this strategy using 
similar Gramscian framing to that informing this paper, as one for galvanizing the U.S. left while 
building better energy and climate policy: “there is a struggle going on within the upper echelons 
of US capital...between the military-petroleum complex that’s still the dominant bloc of capital, 
and greener less polluting forms of capital...we’d probably call it eco-apartheid, because it would 
be, left to its own devices, just as unjust and just as exploitative as gray capitalism.” In the 
political moment of the late 2000s, he argued that left organizers should nonetheless ally 
strategically with the green bloc: “I don’t believe everything works out better when it all falls 
apart, and certainly not from the position of relative organizational ideological weakness that the 
Left is in right now” (Jones, in Mirpuri, Feldman, and Roberts 2009, pp. 405-6). These kinds of 
efforts from Jones and others brought new prominence for community and racial justice 
organizers within the blue-green coalition -- including a seat for Jones on the board of the Apollo 
Alliance, and following Obama’s 2008 election an administration position as green jobs advisor. 
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The 2008 Presidential election, amid the popular anger and openings of the financial crisis, gave 
new force to the green collar jobs movement. Its organizing was fueled by a broader wave of left 
populism that included calls for punishing bankers and condemnations of financial sector 
parasitism on the “real economy”, on a spectrum between radical protest and (ultimately 
dominant) technocratic quasi-fixes. Green collar jobs discourses articulated commonalities 
between U.S. interests, sectors, places, and populations dispossessed and damaged in the crisis, 
including black and minority communities particularly targeted for exploitative subprime loans 
(and see Coates 2014). Moreover, they spoke to the longer-term abandonments, ravages, and 
political undermining of decades of neoliberal political rollout: of polluted and disinvested urban 
neighborhoods like West Oakland, but also labor unions, disinvested industrial regions like the 
Rust Belt, and frustrated climate activists. This organizing aided in the consolidation of a 
significant constituency in Obama’s successful 2008 Presidential campaign (one whose 
commonalities and political potential remain apparent if embattled in the 2010s, as Bernie 
Sanders’ 2016 primary run and subsequent democratic socialist organizing have sounded many 
similar notes).   
 
As Obama’s election gave the green collar jobs call a level of national policy support in the late 
2000s, it encountered new pressures and dilemmas. In the United States, its organizing vision 
was increasingly translated into programs for a new, “green” New Deal and revived 
Keynesianism (and see Tienhaara 2014 on similar visions abroad) -- with considerable 
ambiguities in how the U.S.’s nascent green economy would support such broad-based 
employment. Manufacturing experienced a moment of popular cultural enthusiasm -- a 
(temporary) turn from accustomed lionization of post-industrialism since the New Economy. 
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However, none of a still-young crop of cleantech start-ups provided a clear path to breaking 
through to a new U.S. Golden Age: of global green manufacturing leadership and rents, but with 
national surplus to be this time shared and redistributed beyond the white working class. 
Certainly the stimulus and subsequent Obama Administration programs contained stabs at 
resurrecting U.S. industrial policy. (This proved an uphill battle for a cascade of tech sector, 
domestic political, and global economic reasons too extensive to treat here, but see Block and 
Keller 2011; Caprotti 2015, 2017; Mazzucato 2015; Mulvaney 2016; Knuth 2017, 2018a; 
Goldstein 2018 for various elements.) Quickly, however, it became clear that the construction 
sector was to provide the bulk of immediate green collar jobs in programs such as the crisis-era 
stimulus package. This was so for reasons besides the uncertain future of U.S. manufacturing. 
The collapse of the U.S. housing bubble fueled a keen construction lobby and clear political sell: 
“[putting] construction workers back to work with good jobs that can’t be outsourced” (White 
House 2013). Moreover, already-existing technologies for rooftop solar, building energy 
retrofits, and utility-scale renewable energy needed no blue-sky cleantech breakthroughs to 
deploy. Some funding candidates like the federal weatherization assistance program (WAP) 
already possessed institutional infrastructure and seemed to need only an influx of money to 
become eminently “shovel-ready” (WAP received $5 billion in the stimulus, then nearly equal to 
its cumulative funding over its thirty-plus year history; DOE 2009; Tonn et al. 2011). 
 
Construction jobs represented a significant opportunity for additional reasons. One notable green 
collar jobs call during the 2008 campaign came from the Emerald Cities Partnership, a 
collaboration of entities including COWS and the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) (Grabelsky and Thompson 2010). Proponents sold green construction as an opportunity 
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to effect multiple levels of redress and reparation simultaneously: to a working class hurting 
from the financial crisis, and particularly to black and minority workers. U.S. building trades 
unions were historically notorious for their racial exclusions (Kazin 1988; Sugrue 2004). Now, 
minority workers were to be ushered in with union leaders’ eager welcome, and open 
acknowledgment of past wrongs (see, for example, Ayers in Grabelsky 2010). Of course, there 
was political calculation here, but one with broad potential benefit. The sector promised 
substantial job numbers if successful -- although a host of economic modelers debated precisely 
how many, and how in any case to define a green economy and labor within it. And this 
prospective employment did not benefit only cities and workers of color. For decades, programs 
like WAP have worked equally to ameliorate white rural poverty (Harrison and Popke 2011). To 
try to safeguard the quality of jobs created, administration programs used both union tools like 
Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) (which the George W. Bush Administration had banned on 
federally funded projects) and other federal instruments like prevailing wage rates, via the Davis-
Bacon Act. When the latter was applied to WAP funding, some unions speculated that it might 
help reverse the U.S. residential construction sector’s long decline in union density, pay, and job 
quality (Fine 2011; Osterman and Chimienti 2012). 
 
Reflecting on these early Obama Administration years, it is easy to find classic problems of 
populism. Supporters drawn to Obama’s personal charisma and galvanizing but empty signifiers 
like shared “hope” were disappointed for multiple reasons. Genuine missed opportunities for 
transformative politics5 combined with mundane institutional roadblocks -- for example, WAP 
expansion was notoriously slow, and proved limited in its ability to reform housing construction. 
Moreover, decades of neoliberal political restructuring, ideological undermining, and non-
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planning presented a formidable challenge. However, green collar organizing work from the late 
2000s continues to bear fruit and evolve as a political strategy. For example, as California rolls 
out ambitious clean energy and climate programs, labor and the building trades are forging a 
noteworthy advocacy and policy-shaping role. The prospect of green collar jobs continues to 
bolster policies like the state’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS), expanded in 2015 to require 
state utilities to obtain 50 percent of their power from eligible renewable resources by 2030. 
Moreover, it has helped defend California’s climate policies against fossil industry attack, for 
example the fossil fuel industry-funded Proposition 23 in 2010.6 Much of the state’s new clean 
power comes from utility-scale solar deployment in rural areas. And since most of this 
infrastructure has been constructed with unionized building trades labor, job quality is protected 
by PLAs (which mandate union wages, benefits, and employer training support) and by state-
certified union apprenticeship programs (Jones, Philips, and Zabin 2016). This labor 
infrastructure has had notable success in promoting a racially diverse workforce (Luke et al. 
2017).7 Meanwhile, labor concerns have influenced debates such as the priority of California 
state support for different fractions of its clean energy industry, as high-tech players and 
policymakers back competing visions for the state’s clean energy economy (and see Caprotti 
2015; Knuth 2018a). In 2015, building trades unions helped defeat the rooftop solar industry’s 
lobbying for support in California’s expanded RPS (Roth 2015).8 As labor researchers argued, 
jobs in rooftop solar installation are generally non-union, less well-paid, and lower quality; as 
with the residential construction work that they resemble in other ways (Jones and Zabin 2015). 
Such developments are suggestive rather than conclusive, but present a compelling case for 
ongoing analytical and political attention. 
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Future Directions: From Green Populism to Green Industrial Policy? 
Moving forward, the political experience discussed here suggests multiple insights for energy-
environmental scholarship and praxis. First, it argues that as scholars, we need to think more 
carefully about how we theorize and examine notions like post-political populism, particularly as 
regards the role of left populisms in more overtly liberal-technocratic formations (as indeed 
Obama era programs could appear and be). In part, this is a call for more empirical examination. 
In many ways, the concept of the post-political poorly reflects the material and political 
messiness and contestations of climate and energy politics on the ground. Nor does it capture the 
shifting and contingent alliances involved in dismantling a still-dominant fraction and form of 
capital/ism. As charges of left-elite condescension fly today, including against academics, we 
must take more care to engage what left populist strategy looks like in its own varying 
calculations. 
 
Second, this discussion suggests a window into distinct forms of grievance and reparation arising 
in the experience of clean energy transition, painful as it will be on its losing end. That such an 
experience should stir populist anger should surprise no one. At the same time, such justified 
grievance is one among many forms competing for remedy and reparation today, dense indeed in 
the U.S. contemporary context. Critical energy scholars must cast an eye toward the latter side of 
this equation as well as the former. What forms of reparation are available in the difficult 
contexts we examine, and can we help imagine political strategies that more adequately conjoin 
pragmatism and restorative justice in their application? The 2016 Presidential elections saw 
various alternatives mooted, which from the left included substantial reparations payments to US 
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coal regions. In tackling this thorny problem, the option of green collar jobs creation remains a 
significant one for conceptual and political attention. 
 
Finally, this conclusion suggests a key task for geographical scholarship, and the distinctive 
toolkit that political economic/ecological analysis brings to bear on energy transition as a 
problem, in and beyond the United States. Whatever the strategic achievements and failings of 
the left populist organization surveyed in this discussion, one element that it chronically lacked 
in the 2000s was a clear strategy for more comprehensive green economic development beyond 
strategic sectors. Left populist alliances may have successfully gotten a foot in the door in certain 
political forums, but sectors like construction remain troublingly dependent upon higher-level 
industrial strategies and choices for their long-term prospects. How can we translate a role such 
as now being experimented with in California into a more powerful say in not just who builds 
clean energy infrastructure, but what that clean energy infrastructure consists of and means? 
Resistance from an intransigent fossil fuel bloc and its conservative populist base at home, or 
China’s undeniable successes as a green industrial powerhouse abroad, can only partially 
account for existing limitations here. In addition, we must look critically to U.S. industrial policy 
-- or rather, the country’s long lack of an open one (Block and Keller 2011; Mazzucato 2015; 
Knuth 2018a). If any dimension of U.S. climate politics remains genuinely and stubbornly post-
political, it is a techno-industrial culture that persistently subordinates both left populists and 
policy technocrats themselves to familiar New Economic fallacies: the need for entrepreneurial 
and venture capitalist “genius” and “breakthroughs” to solve problems like energy transition, the 
assumed inadequacies of government economic development planning, and the political 
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irrelevance of most people affected in this decision-making. All of these propositions present 
genuine opportunities for geographers’ intervention: critical, practical, and imaginative. 
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1 And in similar energy-producing contexts -- internal conflicts different from the populist possibilities of 
an external enemy. 
2 Ironically, threatened most directly by that same boom in unconventional oil and gas. These 
explanations remain important, alongside factors like cultural grievance and white racist revanchism. 
3 Or to entice fossil industry executives all too likely to abandon existing workers and regions once 
sufficiently attractive alternatives and exit strategies present themselves -- more straightforward here than 
in places with more complex extractive industry politics (e.g., Andreucci 2018). 
4 This discussion of populism and/as strategic alliance-building draws primarily on Laclau’s Gramsci-
influenced theorization (1977, 2005) (particularly, following Hart 2013 and Andreucci 2017, Laclau’s 
earlier, more political economic conceptualization) -- although with several returns to Swyngedouw’s 
(2010) notion of the post-political. It builds on fieldwork conducted in the Bay Area between 2008 and 
2013, as regional green collar jobs calls consolidated and were incorporated into U.S. federal policy. 
Besides participant observation and policy analysis in relevant forums (both for green collar jobs 
organizing and the cleantech industry), this investigation and follow-ups have involved extensive 
engagement with contemporary archives -- for example, tech industry news and blogs, think tank 
publications, government gray literature, and labor research published in policy and academic forums 
(including by geographers, e.g., Luke et al. 2017). 
5 And other concessions, as when Van Jones was let go from his advisory role after attacks from 
Congressional Republicans. 
6 Notably, Koch Industries. Made via the (unsuccessful in this case) use of the ballot initiative, 
California’s quintessentially populist direct democracy instrument. 
7 Less so in increasing gender diversity, an ongoing problem in construction employment. 
8 Although rooftop solar is not included within generation sources eligible for California’s RPS, it has 
been supported by other state policies.	
																																																						
